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Abstract
The problem of simultaneously generating a secret key (SK) and private key (PK)
pair among three terminals via public discussion is investigated. In this problem, each
terminal observes a component of correlated sources. All three terminals are required
to generate the common SK to be concealed from an eavesdropper that has access
to the public discussion, while two designated terminals are required to generate an
extra PK to be concealed from both the eavesdropper and the remaining terminal. An
outer bound on the SK-PK capacity region was established by Ye and Narayan in [1],
and was shown to be achievable for a special case. In this paper, the SK-PK capacity
region is established in general by developing schemes to achieve the outer bound for
the remaining two cases. The main technique lies in the novel design of a random
binning-joint decoding scheme that achieves the existing outer bound.
1 Introduction
The problem of secret key generation via public discussion under the source model was
initiated by [2, 3], which established a remarkable fact that two terminals, each possessing
correlated but not exactly the same observations, can establish a shared secret key by only
talking to each other in the public. In the basic source-type model considered in [2,3], there
are two legitimate terminals, who observe correlated source sequences and can communicate
with each other through a public channel, and eavesdroppers, who have perfect access to the
public channel. The main observation is that, because of the correlation, terminal X can re-
cover terminal Y ’s source sequence by letting terminal Y send limited amount of information
using distributed source coding technique [4]. Then both terminal X and terminal Y can
generate a shared secret key based on terminal Y ’s source sequence subtracting the informa-
tion that has been revealed. The close connection between the distributed source coding and
secret key generation also holds on more general source-type models [5]. In particular, [5]
studied a general network with multiple terminals, in which a subset of terminals need to
generate a shared secret key. [5] showed that the secret key capacity is equal to the joint
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entropy of all source observations subtracting the minimum amount of information needed
to enable the subset of terminals to recover all source observations.
Until now, with few exceptions to be discussed in the sequel, most of the existing studies
focused on generation of a single key [5–10]. However, there are various practical scenarios
in which multiple keys need to be simultaneously generated. For instance, a number of
terminals can have different security clearance levels, and each terminal is allowed to access
confidential documents up to its own clearance level. Terminals with the same clearance
level should share the same key, and should be kept ignorant of higher level keys.
There have been several existing studies that addressed generation of multiple keys [1,
11–13]. Being of particular interest to us, Ye and Narayan studied a multi-key source-type
model in [1], in which three terminals (say terminals X ,Y and Z) observe correlated source
sequences, and wish to generate a common secret key (SK) among all of them, which should
be concealed from eavesdroppers, and a private key (PK) between X and Y that should be
concealed from Z and eavesdroppers. [1] provided both outer and inner bounds on the SK-
PK capacity region. In particular, the outer bound has three different forms corresponding
respectively to three cases of correlations among the sources. In [1], it was shown that the
outer bound is achievable for one case, and hence the SK-PK capacity region was established
for this case. However, for the other two cases, there are gaps between the outer bound and
the inner bound derived based on the scheme developed in [1]. Finding schemes to achieve
the outer bound for the other two cases was left as an open problem in [1]. In fact, the
outer bound in the other two cases suggests the necessity of a scheme such that X helps Y
to recover Z’s information without revealing any more information of Z to public. This is
the major technical challenge to obtain the SK-PK capacity region in general.
Our main contribution in this paper lies in finding schemes that achieve the outer bound
for the other two cases for the SK-PK source-type model in [1]. Then, combined with the
result in [1] for the first case, the full SK-PK capacity region is established. In order to
address the technical challenge mentioned above, we design schemes such that terminal X
helps to improve the quality of the side information at Y in recovering Z’s information rather
than directly revealing information of Z.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model description. Section 3
presents our main results on the SK-PK capacity region. Section 4 and 5 consist of the proofs
of the main theorem for the two cases, respectively. Section 6 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 System Model
Consider a discrete memoryless source, whose outputs at each time instant are generated
based on the joint distribution of random variables (X, Y, Z) with corresponding alphabets
(X ,Y ,Z). We consider a system with three terminals (X ,Y ,Z) and an eavesdropper. Here,
we use the alphabet symbols to denote the terminals. Terminal X observes n independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of X, i.e., Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), and terminals Y
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and Z observe Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn) and Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn), respectively. We assume that the
eavesdropper does not have source observations and terminals are allowed to communicate
with each other over a public noiseless channel with no rate constraint. We further assume
that all transmissions over the public channel are observable to all parties including the
eavesdropper. The public discussion can be interactive. Without loss of generality, we
assume that terminals (X ,Y ,Z) take turns to transmit for r rounds over 3r consecutive
time slots. We use 3r random variables F1, · · · , F3r to denote these transmissions, where
Ft denotes the transmission in time slot t for 1 ≤ t ≤ 3r. The transmission Ft can be any
function of its own observation and all previous transmissions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1). We
use F = (F1, · · · , F3r) to denote all transmissions in 3r time slots. Furthermore, we note that
although our result in this paper also holds for the case that allows additional randomization
at each terminal, we do not explicitly allow such randomization in our model for simplicity.
In this system (see Fig. 1), terminals X ,Y and Z wish to generate a common secret key
KS, which is required to be kept secure from the eavesdropper (that has access to only the
public discussion). Furthermore, terminals X and Y wish to generate a private key KP ,
which is required to be kept secure not only from the eavesdropper but also from terminal
Z.
X: Xn
Z: Zn
Y: Yn
SK
PK
Public 
Discussion
E
Figure 1: System model
We next introduce the mathematical definition of the secret key and the private key. A
random variable U is said to be -recoverable from another random variable V , if there exists
a function f such that
Pr{U 6= f(V )} < . (1)
Definition 1. A pair (KS, KP ) is said to be an -(SK, PK) if KS and KP satisfy the following
requirements.
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• KS is -recoverable at each of the three terminals with the public transmission F, i.e., it
can be -recoverable from (Xn,F), (Y n,F) and (Zn,F), respectively;
• KP is -recoverable at terminals X and Y with public transmission F, i.e., it can be
-recoverable from (Xn,F) and (Y n,F), respectively;
• KS and KP satisfy the secrecy condition
1
n
I(KS; F) < , (2)
1
n
I(KP ; F, Z
n) <  (3)
for large enough n, where  can be arbitrarily small; and
• KS and KP satisfy the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KS) ≥ 1
n
log |KS | − , (4)
1
n
H(KP ) ≥ 1
n
log |KP | − , (5)
for large enough n, where |KS | and |KP | denote the alphabet sizes of the random variable KS
and KP , respectively.
We note that the secrecy conditions (2) and (3) are in the weak sense, and can be strength-
ened to the strong sense without loss of performance as in [14].
Definition 2. A rate pair (RS, RP ) is said to be an achievable SK-PK rate pair if for every
 > 0, δ > 0, and for sufficiently large n, there exists an -(SK,PK) pair (K
(n)
S , K
(n)
P ) such
that
1
n
H(K
(n)
S ) > RS − δ,
1
n
H(K
(n)
P ) > RP − δ. (6)
Our goal is to characterize the SK-PK capacity region that contains all achievable rate
pairs (RS, RP ).
3 Main Results
3.1 Preliminaries
The model introduced in Section 2 has been studied by Ye and Narayan in [1], which provided
outer and inner bounds on the SK-PK capacity region (see Chapter 3 in [13] for more details).
We cite the outer bound in [1] below, which is useful for presenting our results in the next
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subsection. For notational convenience, we define
RA := I(Z;XY ), (7)
RB := min{I(X;Y Z), I(Y ;XZ)}, (8)
RC :=
1
2
(H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(X, Y, Z)). (9)
Theorem 1. [1] An outer bound on the SK-PK capacity region for the model in Section 2
contains the rate pairs (RS, RP ) satisfying
RS ≤ RA, (10)
RP ≤ I(X;Y |Z), (11)
RS +RP ≤ RB, (12)
2RS +RP ≤ 2RC . (13)
where the constants RA, RB and RC are defined in (7)-(9).
It is instructional to first note a few observations about the above outer bound.
1. If we dedicate to generate the private key KP without considering the secret key KS,
then the model becomes the private key model studied in [5]. The outer bound on RP is
(11), which can be achieved by letting terminal Z reveal all its information to public. Here
terminal Z is curious but honest, and helps to generate the private key.
2. If we dedicate to generate the secret key KS without considering the private key KP ,
then the model reduces to the secret key model studied in [5]. Correspondingly the above
outer bound reduces to RS ≤ min{RA, RB, RC} based on (10), (12) and (13). According
to [5], this bound is achievable by applying the “omniscience” scheme, which requires each
terminal recover the sources of all three terminals after the public discussion.
3. The sum rate bound (12) can be viewed as a cut-set type bound, because both X and
Y need to generate two keys KS and KP simultaneously.
We next further explain the above outer bound in detail. We note that this outer bound
can take three different structures corresponding respectively to the following three cases:
case 1 with RB = min{RA, RB, RC}, case 2 with RC = min{RA, RB, RC}, and case 3 with
RA = min{RA, RB, RC}.
For case 1, it was shown in [1] that the outer bound (as illustrated in Fig. 2) is achievable.
It is clear that the point B with the rate coordinates (RB, 0) is achievable by applying the
“omniscience” scheme in [5] and the point E with the rate coordinates (0, I(X;Y |Z)) is
achievable by letting Z reveal all of its information to public. The corner point T with
the rate coordinates (RB − I(X;Y |Z), I(X;Y |Z)) is shown to be achievable in [1]. The
idea is to let Z reveal information at rate RZ = max{H(Z|X), H(Z|Y )} so that both X
and Y can recover Zn correctly with probability close to 1. Now Zn is the information
shared by three terminals, and hence the secret key KS can be generated based on Z
n with
rate RS = H(Z) − RZ = min{I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)}. Then, given Zn, terminals X and Y
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can generate a private key with rate RP = I(X;Y |Z) if terminal X reveals information at
rate RX = H(X|Y Z) to terminal Y . Finally, the entire outer bound can be achieved by
time-sharing scheme.
RS
RP
I(X;Y|Z)
T
B
RB-I(X;Y|Z)
O
E
RB
Figure 2: Out bound for case 1: the quadrangle O-E-T-B-O
In this paper, we show that the outer bound can be achieved for cases 2 and 3. Thus, this
outer bound is the SK-PK capacity region in general.
3.2 Main Theorem
Our main contribution in this paper lies in finding schemes that achieve the outer bound
in Theorem 1 for cases 2 and 3. Thus, combined with the result in [1] for case 1, the SK-
PK capacity region is established in general. We provide our main result in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. The outer bound in Theorem 1 is achievable for cases 2 and 3, and hence is
the SK-PK capacity region for the model given in Section 2 in general.
We next provide general ideas for the design of achievable schemes for cases 2 and 3. The
detailed proof is provided in Sections 4 and 5.
In case 2, RC = min{RA, RB, RC}. The outer bound in Theorem 1 is plotted in Fig. 3
as the pentagon O-E-T-P-C-O. It has been shown in [1] that the corner points E, T and C
are achievable. It is thus sufficient to show that the point P is achievable. Then the entire
pentagon can be achieved by time sharing.
We note that the rate coordinates of the point P is(
max{I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)}, RB −max{I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)}
)
.
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RS
RP
T
P
I(X;Y|Z)
RB
2RC
RC RB RA
max{I(X;Z), I(Y;Z)}
RB-max I(X;Z),I(Y;Z)}
E
O
C
Figure 3: Outer bound for case 2: the pentagon O-E-T-P-C-O
Without loss of generality, we assume that I(X;Z) > I(Y ;Z) (the argument for the opposite
assumption is similar), and henceRB = I(Y ;XZ) and the point P becomes (I(X;Z), I(Y ;XZ)−
I(X;Z)). The SK rate RS = I(X;Z) suggests that the highest rate that Z can transmit
publicly is H(Z|X), with which X recovers Zn, but Y cannot recover Zn. Then X must
transmit some information to help Y to recover Zn so that all three terminals can generate
a secret key based on Zn. Furthermore, the information transmitted by terminal X also
helps Y to recover Xn so that X and Y can generate a private key. The critical part of
our achievable scheme lies in that terminal X ’s transmission should help Y to recover Zn
without revealing more information about Zn to public beyond terminal Z’s transmission.
Otherwise, the SK rate RS = I(X;Z) is not achievable. The idea is that X helps Y to im-
prove its resolvability of Zn rather than revealing information about Zn directly. Section 4.2
provides further technical intuition of the achievable scheme based on typicality arguments.
In case 3, RA = min{RA, RB, RC}. The outer bound in Theorem 1 is plotted in Fig. 4 as
the hexagon O-E-T-P-Q-A-O. It has been shown in [1] that the corner points E, T and A
are achievable. The point P can be achieved by applying the same scheme as in case 2. It
is thus sufficient to show that the point Q is achievable. Then the entire hexagon can be
achieved by time sharing.
The rate coordinates of the point Q is given by (I(Z;XY ), I(X;Y ) − I(Z;XY )). The
SK rate I(Z;XY ) suggests that the highest rate that Z can transmit publicly is H(Z|XY ),
with which neither X nor Y can recover Zn. Then both X and Y must help each other to
recover Zn so that all three terminals can generate a secret key based on Zn. Furthermore,
terminal Y also helps terminal X to recover Y n so that X and Y can generate a private
key. The critical part lies in that X and Y ’s transmission help each other to recover Zn
without revealing more information about Zn to public beyond terminal Z’s transmission.
Otherwise, the SK rate RS = I(Z;XY ) is not achievable. The idea is that X and Y help
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RS
RP
I(X;Y|Z)
RB
RA RC RB
2RC
T
P
Q
I(X;Y)-I(Z;X,Y)
max{I(X;Z),I(Y;Z)}
RB-max{I(X;Z),I(Y;Z)}
RB-I(X;Y|Z)
E
O
A
Figure 4: Outer bound for case 3: the hexagon O-E-T-P-Q-A-O
each other to improve their resolvability of Zn rather than revealing information about Zn
directly. Section 5.2 provides further technical intuition of the achievable scheme based on
typicality arguments.
4 Achievability Proof for Case 2
In this section, we provide the achievability proof for case 2 with subsection 4.1 containing
the technical proof and subsection 4.2 containing further intuitive justification.
4.1 Technical Proof
In this subsection, we show that the outer bound given in Theorem 1 for case 2 is achievable.
In this case, RC = min{RA, RB, RC}. We assume that RC < RB, which implies
I(X;Y ) ≤ I(Z;XY ), (14)
I(X;Z) < I(Y ;XZ), (15)
I(Y ;Z) < I(X;Y Z). (16)
The case of equality with RC = RB reduces to case 1.
The outer bound for case 2 is plotted in Fig. 3 as the pentagon O-E-T-P-C-O. As we
mentioned in Section 3.2 it has been shown in [1] that the corner points E, T and C are
achievable. It is thus sufficient to show that the point P is achievable. Then the entire
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pentagon can be achieved by time sharing. We note that the rate coordinate corresponding
to the point P is (max{I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)}, RB − max{I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z)}). Without loss of
generality, we assume that I(X;Z) > I(Y ;Z) (the argument when I(X;Z) < I(Y ;Z) is
similar), and hence RB = I(Y ;XZ) and the point P becomes (I(X;Z), I(Y ;XZ)−I(X;Z)).
Our scheme to achieve point P is based on random binning and joint typicality.
Codebook Generation: At terminal Z, randomly and independently assign a bin index f
to each sequence zn ∈ Zn, where f ∈ [1 : 2nRZ ] with RZ given by
RZ = H(Z|X) + . (17)
We use f(zn) to denote the bin index of the sequence zn, and use BZ(f) to denote the bin
indexed by f . Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index φ to each sequence
in each nonempty bin BZ(f), where φ ∈ [1 : 2nRS ] with RS given by
RS = I(X;Z)− 2δ()− 2. (18)
We further use BZ(f, φ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by φ within the bin BZ(f).
At terminal X , randomly and independently assign a bin index g to each sequence xn ∈ X n,
where g ∈ [1 : 2nRX ] with RX given by
RX = H(XZ|Y )−H(Z|X). (19)
We use g(xn) to denote the bin index of the sequence xn, and use BX (g) to denote the bin
indexed by g. Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index ψ to each sequence
in each nonempty bin BX (g), where ψ ∈ [1 : 2nRP ] with RP given by
RP = I(XZ;Y )− I(X;Z)− 2δ()− . (20)
We further use BX (g, ψ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by ψ within the bin BX (g).
It can be verified that RX < H(X|Z) and RP > 0 based on the case assumption (15).
This codebook assignment is known by all parties, i.e., terminals X ,Y ,Z and the eaves-
dropper.
Encoding and Transmission: Given a sequence zn, terminal Z finds the index pair (f, φ)
such that zn ∈ BZ(f, φ), and then reveals the index f = f(zn) over the public channel to all
parties, i.e., terminals X ,Y and the eavesdropper.
Given a sequence xn, terminal X finds the index pair (g, ψ) such that xn ∈ BX (g, ψ), and
then reveals the index g = g(xn) over the public channel to all parties, i.e., terminals Y ,Z
and the eavesdropper.
Decoding: The decoding scheme is based on the joint typicality. We use T
(n)
 (PXY Z) to
denote the strongly joint -typical set based on the joint distribution PXY Z .
Terminal X , given xn and the bin index f , claims z˜n as recovery of zn if there exists a
unique sequence z˜n ∈ BZ(f) that satisfies (z˜n, xn) ∈ T (n) (PXZ), or claims decoding failure
otherwise.
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Terminal Y , given yn and the bin indexes f and g, claims (zˆn, xˆn) as recovery of (zn, xn),
if there exist a unique pair of sequences (zˆn, xˆn) such that zˆn ∈ BZ(f), xˆn ∈ BX (g), and
(xˆn, zˆn, yn) ∈ T (n) (PXY Z), or claims decoding failure otherwise.
Due to (17) and (19), it can be verified that RZ > H(Z|XY ), RX > H(X|Y Z) and
RX + RZ > H(XZ|Y ) which implies the following inequalities hold according to the result
of distributed source coding problem in [4, 5, 15]:
Pr{Zn 6= Z˜n} < , (21)
Pr{Xn 6= Xˆn or Zn 6= Zˆn} < . (22)
Key Generation: Terminal Z claims KS = φ(Zn). Terminal X claims K˜S = φ(Z˜n) and
KP = ψ(X
n). Terminal Y claims KˆS = φ(Zˆn) and KˆP = ψ(Xˆn). Due to (21) and (22), we
have
Pr{KS = K˜S = KˆS} > 1− , (23)
Pr{KP = KˆP} > 1− . (24)
Analysis of Secrecy: We evaluate the leakage key rate averaged over the random codebook
ensemble. Due to (21) and (22), in order to prove that the secrecy requirements (2) and (3)
hold, it is sufficient to show the following two inequalities hold:
1
n
I(KS; F|C) < , (25)
1
n
I(KP ; FZ
n|C) < . (26)
To simplify notations, let f := f(Zn), and g := g(Xn). Hence f and g are random variables
transmitted over the public channel, where the randomness is not only due to random real-
izations of the source sequences, but also due to random binning assignments (i.e., random
codebook generation). It is also clear that the public transmission F = {f, g}. We further
let φ := φ(Zn) and ψ := ψ(Xn). Hence, KP = ψ and KS = φ. Then, we have
I(KS; F|C) = I(φ; f, g|C)
= I(φ; f |C) + I(φ; g|f, C)
≤ I(φ; f |C) + I(φ, f ; g|C)
(a)
≤ I(φ; f |C) + I(Zn; g|C) (27)
where (a) follows from the fact that given zn and codebook C, f and φ are deterministic and
independent from all other variables. We further derive
I(KP ; F, Z
n|C) = I(ψ; f, g, Zn|C)
= I(ψ; g, Zn|C)
= I(ψ; g|C) + I(ψ;Zn|g, C)
≤ I(ψ; g|C) + I(ψ, g;Zn|C). (28)
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We next show that each of the three terms I(φ; f |C), I(ψ; g|C) and I(ψ, g;Zn|C) can be
arbitrarily small for n large enough. We first consider
I(φ; f |C) = I(φ, Zn; f |C)− I(Zn; f |φ, C)
= I(Zn; f |C)− I(Zn; f |φ, C)
= H(Zn|C)−H(Zn|f, C)−H(Zn|φ, C) +H(Zn|f, φ, C).
It is clear that
H(Zn|f, C) = H(Zn, f |C)−H(f |C) = H(Zn|C)−H(f |C) ≥ H(Zn|C)− nRZ
Similarly, we have H(Zn|φ, C) ≥ H(Zn|C)− nRS. Thus,
I(φ; f |C) ≤ n(RS +RZ −H(Z)) +H(Zn|f, φ, C) (29)
where we used the fact that Zn is independent from C, and hence H(Zn|C) = nH(Z). In
order to bound the last term, we introduce the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1. If RS +RZ < H(Z)− 2δ(), then
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Zn|f, φ, C) < H(Z)−RS −RZ + δ()
Proof. See Appendix A.
Following from Lemma 1 and (17) and (18), we have
1
n
I(φ; f |C) < δ() (30)
for sufficiently large n. Following the same arguments, we show that
1
n
I(ψ; g|C) < δ() (31)
for sufficiently large n.
We then consider the term I(ψ, g;Zn|C) and have
I(ψ, g;Zn|C) = I(ψ, g,Xn;Zn|C)− I(Xn;Zn|ψ, g, C)
= I(Xn;Zn|C)− I(Xn;Zn|ψ, g, C)
= H(Xn|C)−H(Xn|Zn, C)−H(Xn|ψ, g, C) +H(Xn|Zn, ψ, g, C)
where
H(Xn|ψ, g, C) = H(Xn, ψ, g|C)−H(ψ, g|C)
= H(Xn|C)−H(ψ, g|C)
≥ H(Xn|C)− n(RX +RP ).
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Hence,
I(ψ, g;Zn|C) ≤ n(RX +RP −H(X|Z)) +H(Xn|Zn, ψ, g, C)
Similarly to Lemma 1, we can show that if
RX +RP < H(X|Z)− 2δ(), (32)
then,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Xn|Zn, ψ, g, C) < H(X|Z)−RX −RP + δ(). (33)
Consequently,
1
n
I(ψ, g;Zn|C) < δ() (34)
for sufficiently large n. This also implies that
1
n
I(g;Zn|C) < δ() (35)
for sufficiently large n. Therefore, substituting (30), (31), (34) and (35) into (27) and (28),
we show that the leakage rates vanish for large enough n.
Uniformity: Following from Lemma 22.2 in [15], we conclude that if RS < H(Z) − 4δ(),
then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KS|C) ≥ RS − δ(), (36)
and if RP < H(X)− 4δ(), then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KP |C) ≥ RP − δ(), (37)
which prove the uniformity of the two keys.
Existence of a Codebook: We finally note that we have shown that
Pr{KS = K˜S = KˆS}+ Pr{KP = KˆP}+ I(KS; F|C) + I(KP ;FZn|C)
+
[
RS − 1
n
H(KS|C)
]
+
[
RP − 1
n
H(KP |C)
]
converges to zero as n→∞. This implies
EC
{
Pr{KS = K˜S = KˆS
∣∣C = c}+ Pr{KP = KˆP ∣∣C = c}+ I(KS; F|C = c) + I(KP ;FZn|C = c)
+
[
RS − 1
n
H(KS|C = c)
]
+
[
RP − 1
n
H(KP |C = c)
]}
converges to zero as n → ∞. Thus, there must exist one codebook C such that each term
converges to zero as n→∞ due to non-negativity of all terms. Therefore, such a codebook
satisfies all requirements simultaneously.
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4.2 Intuitive Justification of Secrecy
In this subsection, we intuitively explain that the generated KS and KP satisfy the secrecy
requirements (2) and (3).
We first justify that KS, which is set as φ(Z
n), is almost independent from the public
communication. Firstly, φ(Zn), as the sub-bin index, is assigned independently from the bin
index f(Zn), and hence is almost independent from the public transmission by Z. It is then
sufficient to justify that φ is almost independent of g(Xn) given f . Given g, the bin BX (g)
contains 2nI(XZ;Y ) typical xn sequences on average. This implies that there are the same
number 2n(I(XZ;Y )−I(X;Z)) ≥ 1 of xn that are jointly typical with any typical zn in BZ(f).
Hence, the bin index g does not distinguish among zn within the bin BZ(f), and hence does
not distinguish among φ(zn). On the other hand, if the alphabet of g is too large such that
|BX (g)| < 2nI(X;Z), then there must exist some zn in bin BZ(f) for which joint typical xn
does not exist in the bin BX (g). In this case, g reveals some information about zn, which
can suggest exclusion of φ indices of those zn from being the key.
We then justify that KP , which is set as ψ(X
n), is almost independent from the public
communication and Zn. It is clear that ψ(Xn) is independent from g(Xn). It is then sufficient
to justify that ψ is almost independent from Zn given g. On average, any sub-bin within
the bin g contains 2nI(X;Z) typical sequences xn. This implies that there exists one xn (on
average) in each sub-bin that is jointly typical with a typical zn. Hence, knowing Zn does
not distinguish among sub-bins of xn. This justifies ψ(Xn) is almost independent from Zn.
5 Achievability Proof for Case 3
In this section, we provide the achievability proof for case 2 with subsection 5.1 containing
the technical proof and subsection 5.2 containing further intuitive justification.
5.1 Technical Proof
In this subsection, we show that the outer bound given in Theorem 1 for case 3 is achievable.
In case 3, RA = min{RA, RB, RC}. In fact, the only possible case is RA < RC ≤ RB [1],
which implies
I(X;Y ) > I(Z;XY ), (38)
I(X;Z) ≤ I(Y ;XZ), (39)
I(Y ;Z) ≤ I(X;Y Z). (40)
The case of equality with RA = RC reduces to case 2.
The outer bound in Theorem 1 for case 3 is plotted in Fig. 4 as the hexagon O-E-T-P-Q-
A-O. It has been shown in [1] that the corner points E, T and A are achievable. The point
P can be achieved by the same scheme as in case 2. It is thus sufficient to show that the
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point Q whose rate coordinates are given by (I(Z;XY ), I(X;Y )− I(Z;XY )), is achievable.
Then the entire hexagon can be achieved by time sharing. Our scheme to achieve the point
Q is based on random binning and joint typicality.
Codebook Generation: At terminal Z, randomly and independently assign a bin index f
to each sequence zn ∈ Zn, where f ∈ [1 : 2nRZ ] with RZ given by
RZ = H(Z|X, Y ) + + 2δ(). (41)
We use f(zn) to denote the bin index of the sequence zn, and use BZ(f) to denote the bin
indexed by f . Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index φ to each sequence
in each nonempty bin BZ(f), where φ ∈ [1 : 2nRS ] with RS given by
RS = I(Z;XY )− 2− 4δ(). (42)
We further use BZ(f, φ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by φ within the bin BZ(f).
At terminal X , randomly and independently assign a bin index g to each sequence xn ∈ X n,
where g ∈ [1 : 2nRX ] with RX given by
RX = H(X|Y ) + . (43)
We use g(xn) to denote the bin index of the sequence xn, and use BX (g) to denote the bin
indexed by g. Then randomly and independently assign a sub-bin index ψ to each sequence
in each nonempty bin BX (g), where ψ ∈ [1 : 2nRP ] with RP given by
RP = I(X;Y )− I(Z;XY )− 2− 2δ(). (44)
We further use BX (g, ψ) to denote the sub-bin indexed by ψ within the bin BX (g).
At terminal Y , randomly and independently assign a bin index l to each sequence yn ∈ Yn,
where l ∈ [1 : 2nRY ] with RY given by
RY = H(Y |X)− 2δ(). (45)
We use l(yn) to denote the bin index of the sequence yn, and use BY(l) to denote the bin
indexed by l.
It can be verified that RP > 0 based on the case assumption (38).
This codebook assignment is revealed to all parties, i.e., terminals X ,Y ,Z and the eaves-
dropper.
Encoding and Transmission: Given a sequence zn, terminal Z finds the index pair (f, φ)
such that zn ∈ BZ(f, φ), and then reveals the index f = f(zn) over the public channel to all
parties, i.e., terminals X ,Y and the eavesdropper. Given a sequence xn, terminal X finds
the index pair (g, ψ) such that xn ∈ BX (g, ψ), and then reveals the index g = g(xn) over the
public channel to all parties, i.e., terminals Y ,Z and the eavesdropper. Given a sequence
yn, terminal Y finds the index l such that yn ∈ BY(l), and then reveals the index l = l(yn)
over the public channel to all parties, i.e., terminals X ,Z and the eavesdropper.
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Decoding: Terminal X , given xn and the bin indexes f of zn and l of yn, claims (z˜n, y˜n) as
recovery of (zn, yn) if there exists a unique pair (z˜n, y˜n) such that z˜n ∈ BZ(f), y˜n ∈ BY(l),
and (z˜n, y˜n, xn) ∈ T (n) (PXY Z), or claims decoding failure otherwise.
Terminal Y , given yn and the bin indexes f of zn and g of xn, claims (zˆn, xˆn) as recovery
of (zn, xn) if there exists a unique pair (zˆn, xˆn) such that zˆn ∈ BZ(f), xˆn ∈ BX (g), and
(zˆn, xˆn, yn) ∈ T (n) (PXY Z), or claims decoding failure otherwise.
We further assume that
H(Y |X) > H(Y |XZ). (46)
The case of equality implies that the point Q coincides with the point P, and can hence
be achieved using the scheme given in case 2. Then due to (41), (43) and (45), it can be
verified that RZ > H(Z|XY ), RX > H(X|Y Z), RY > H(Y |XZ), RX + RZ > H(XZ|Y )
and RY + RZ > H(Y Z|X) hold. It can then be shown that the following inequalities hold,
according to the result of distributed source coding problem in [4, 5, 15]:
Pr{Zn 6= Z˜n or Y n 6= Y˜ n} < , (47)
Pr{Xn 6= Xˆn or Zn 6= Zˆn} < . (48)
Key Generation: Terminal Z claims KS = φ(Zn). Terminal X claims K˜S = φ(Z˜n) and
KP = ψ(X
n). Terminal Y claims KˆS = φ(Zˆn) and KˆP = ψ(Xˆn). Due to (47) and (48), we
have
Pr{KS = K˜S = KˆS} > 1− , (49)
Pr{KP = KˆP} > 1− . (50)
Analysis of Secrecy: We evaluate the key leakage rates averaged over the random codebook
ensemble as follows. We let l := l(Y n) and now F = {f, g, l}. We then derive the following
bounds:
I(KS; F|C) = I(φ; f, g, l|C)
= I(φ; f |C) + I(φ; g, l|f, C)
≤ I(φ; f |C) + I(φ, f ; g, l|C)
≤ I(φ; f |C) + I(Zn; g, l|C) (51)
I(KP ; F, Z
n|C) = I(ψ; f, g, l, Zn|C)
= I(ψ; g, l, Zn|C)
= I(ψ; g|C) + I(ψ; l|g, C) + I(ψ;Zn|g, l, C)
≤ I(ψ; g|C) + I(ψ, g; l|C) + I(ψ, g, l;Zn|C). (52)
We next show that each of the four terms I(φ; f |C), I(ψ; g|C), I(ψ, g; l|C) and I(ψ, g, l;Zn|C)
can be arbitrarily small for large enough n. Following the same steps as in case 2 we can
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show that
I(φ; f |C) < δ(), (53)
I(ψ; g|C) < δ() (54)
for large enough n. We then consider the term I(ψ, g; l|C), and have
I(ψ, g; l|C) ≤ I(ψ, g,Xn; l|C)
= I(Xn; l|C)
= I(Xn; l, Y n|C)− I(Xn;Y n|l, C)
= I(Xn;Y n|C)− I(Xn;Y n|l, C)
= H(Y n|C)−H(Y n|Xn, C)−H(Y n|l, C) +H(Y n|Xn, l, C)
(a)
≤ H(Y n|C)−H(Y n|Xn, C)− (H(Y n|C)− nRY) +H(Y n|Xn, l, C)
(b)
= n(RY −H(Y |X)) +H(Y n|Xn, l, C)
where (a) follows because
H(Y n|l, C) = H(Y n, l|C)−H(l|C) = H(Y n|C)−H(l|C) ≥ H(Y n|C)− nRY ,
and (b) follows because
H(Y n|Xn, C) = H(Y n|Xn) = nH(Y |X).
Similarly to Lemma 1, we can show that if
RY ≤ H(Y |X)− 2δ(), (55)
then
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Y n|Xn, l, C) < H(Y |X)−RY + δ(). (56)
Consequently, we obtain
1
n
I(ψ, g; l|C) < δ() (57)
for sufficiently large n.
For the term I(ψ, g, l;Zn|C), we derive the following bound:
I(ψ, g, l;Zn|C)
= I(ψ, g, l, Xn, Y n;Zn|C)− I(Xn, Y n;Zn|ψ, g, l, C)
= I(Xn, Y n;Zn|C)− I(Xn, Y n;Zn|ψ, g, l, C)
= H(Xn, Y n|C)−H(Xn, Y n|Zn, C)−H(Xn, Y n|ψ, g, l, C) +H(Xn, Y n|Zn, ψ, g, l, C)
(a)
≤ H(Xn, Y n|C)−H(Xn, Y n|Zn, C)
− (H(Xn, Y n|C)− n(RX +RY +RP )) +H(Xn, Y n|Zn, ψ, g, l, C)
(b)
= n(−H(X, Y |Z) +RX +RY +RP ) +H(Xn, Y n|Zn, ψ, g, l, C)
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where (a) follows because
H(Xn, Y n|ψ, g, l, C) = H(Xn, Y n, ψ, g, l|C)−H(ψ, g, l|C)
= H(Xn, Y n|C)−H(ψ, g, l|C)
≥ H(Xn, Y n|C)− n(RX +RY +RP ),
and (b) follows because
H(Xn, Y n|Zn, C) = H(Xn, Y n|Zn) = nH(X, Y |Z).
Similarly to Lemma 1, we can show that if
RX +RY +RP < H(X, Y |Z)− 2δ(), (58)
then,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Xn, Y n|Zn, ψ, g, l, C) < H(X, Y |Z)−RX −RY −RP + δ(). (59)
Consequently, we have
1
n
I(ψ, g, l;Zn|C) < δ() (60)
for large enough n. This also implies that
1
n
I(g, l;Zn|C) < δ() (61)
for sufficiently large n. Therefore, substituting (53), (54), (57), (60) and (61) into (51) and
(52), we show that the leakage rates vanish for large enough n.
Uniformity: Following from Lemma 22.2 in [15], we conclude that if RS < H(Z) − 4δ(),
then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KS|C) ≥ RS − δ(),
and if RP < H(X)− 4δ(), then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KP |C) ≥ RP − δ(),
which prove the uniformity of the two keys.
Existence of a Codebook: This can be argued in the similar way as for case 2.
5.2 Intuitive Justification of Secrecy
In this subsection, we intuitively explain that the generated secret and private keys KS and
KP satisfy the secrecy requirements (2) and (3).
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We first justify that KS, which is set as φ(Z
n), is almost independent from the public
communication. Firstly, it is clear that φ(Zn) is almost independent from f . It is then
sufficient to justify that φ(Zn) is almost independent of g(Xn) and l(Y n) given f(Zn). For
any given g and l, there are on average 2nI(X;Y ) jointly typical pairs of (xn, yn) such that
(xn, yn) ∈ BX (g)×BY(l). This implies that there are 2n(I(X;Y )−I(XY ;Z)) ≥ 1 pairs of (xn, yn)
being jointly typical with any typical zn in BZ(f). Hence, the bin indexes g and l do not
distinguish among zn within the bin BZ(f), and hence do not distinguish among the index
φ of zn.
We then justify that KP , which is set as ψ(X
n), is almost independent from the public
communication and Zn. It is clear that ψ(Xn) is independent from g(Xn). Similarly to case
2, we can argue that ψ is almost independent from the bin index l of Y n given g. It is then
sufficient to justify that ψ is independent from Zn given l and g. On average, any sub-bin
BX (g, ψ) within the bin BX (g) contains 2nI(XY ;Z) typical sequences xn, and thus for a given
l, there are 2nI(XY ;Z) jointly typical pairs of (xn, yn) in each BX (g, ψ) × BY(l) for any ψ.
This implies that there exists one pair (xn, yn) (on average) in each BX (g, ψ) × BY(l) that
is jointly typical with a typical zn. Hence, given l and g, knowing Zn does not distinguish
among sub-bins of xn. This justifies that, knowing Zn and the bin index pair (g, l), one does
not have preference of determining the sub-bin in which the true Xn lies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the three-terminal source-type model of simultaneously gener-
ating a secret and private key pair. We have shown that random binning and joint decoding
schemes achieve an existing outer bound on the SK-PK capacity region established in [1] for
two cases. Hence, jointly with the capacity region established in [1] for one case, the SK-PK
capacity region for this model is characterized in general. As future work, we will extend
this study to more general networks with more than three terminals. We will also apply the
idea of our achievable schemes to other multi-key generation source models.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof adapts the proof of Lemma 22.3 in [15] with variations. For the sake of complete-
ness, we provide the detail here.
Let
E1 =
{
1, if Zn /∈ T (n) (PZ),
0, otherwise.
(62)
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Hence Pr{E1 = 1} → 0 as n→∞.
We have the following bound:
H(Zn|f, φ, C)
≤ H(Zn, E1|f, φ, C)
= H(E1|f, φ, C) +H(Zn|E1, f, φ, C)
≤ 1 + nPr{E1 = 1} log |Z|+H(Zn|E1 = 0, f, φ, C)
= 1 + nPr{E1 = 1} log |Z|+
∑
(i,j)
Pr
(
f = i, φ = j
∣∣E1 = 0)H(Zn|E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C).
(63)
For a given codebook C, let N(C) be the number of sequences zn ∈ BZ(i, j) ∩ T (n) (PZ).
Define
E2(C) =
{
1, if N(C) ≥ 2E[N(C)],
0, otherwise.
(64)
Note that N(C) ∼ Binomial(|T (n) (PZ)|, 2−n(RS+RZ)). Thus,
E[N(C)] = 2−n(RS+RZ)|T (n) (PZ)|, (65)
Var[N(C)] ≤ 2−n(RS+RZ)|T (n) (PZ)|. (66)
By Chebyshev Inequality, we have
Pr{E2(C) = 1} ≤ Var[N(C)]
(E[N(C)])2 ≤ 2
−n[H(Z)−RS−RZ−δ()]. (67)
Hence, if RS +RZ ≤ H(Z)− 2δ(), then Pr{E2(C) = 1} → 0 as n→∞. Now,
H(Zn|E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C)
≤ H(Zn, E2|E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C)
= H(E2|E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C) +H(Zn|E2, E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C)
≤ 1 + nPr{E2 = 1} log |Z|+H(Zn|E2 = 0, E1 = 0, f = i, φ = j, C)
≤ 1 + nPr{E2 = 1} log |Z|+ n(H(Z)−RS −RZ + δ()) (68)
Substituting (68) into (63), we conclude that if
RS +RZ ≤ H(Z)− 2δ(), (69)
then
1
n
H(Zn|f, φ, C) ≤ H(Z)−RS −RZ + δ(), as n→∞. (70)
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